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I.

INTRODUCTION

T

he United States’ Department of Defense defines autonomous weapons
as “weapon systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”1 Autonomous weapon systems are widely predicted to be the future of war fighting, at least in the
armed forces of highly industrialized nations.2 Consequently, there is now a
vigorous debate going on about the ethics and policy of both the development and deployment of such weapons.3
1. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon
Systems (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf.
2. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2009).
3. The literature on this topic is now too large to attempt to cite here in any detail.
However, for some representative examples, see Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C.
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the
Laws of War Can, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2013), http://www.cfr.org/
drones/law-ethics-autonomous-weapon-systems-why-ban-wont-work-laws-war-can/p
30445; Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, 9 JOURNAL OF
MILITARY ETHICS 332 (2010); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human
Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012); Jason Borenstein, The Ethics of Autonomous Military
Robots, 2 STUDIES IN ETHICS, LAW, AND TECHNOLOGY, Issue 1, Article 2 (2008); ARMIN
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A key controversy in this debate concerns the likelihood that autonomous weapon systems (AWS) will be capable of reliably distinguishing between civilian and military objects.4 This is obviously a crucial question and
one that I have discussed elsewhere.5 However, for the sake of the current
paper, I want to assume that—as seems likely—in at least some domains
AWS will have the capacity to do this to a high degree of accuracy. While
distinguishing insurgents from the civilian population in urban settings may
be beyond the capacity of robots for many years yet, distinguishing between a tank and civilian cars or trucks is well within the capacity of existing systems. Moreover, in some domains, such as submarine warfare or
missions directed at enemy air defenses, there may be no potential targets
other than military objects.6

KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
(2009); Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW 272 (2011); Michael
N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013); Noel E. Sharkey,
Cassandra or False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War, 23 IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 14
(2008); SINGER, supra note 2; Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED
PHILOSOPHY 62 (2007); Robert Sparrow, Robots and Respect: Assessing the Case against
Autonomous Weapon Systems 30 ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2016 (forthcoming).
4. KRISHNAN, supra note 3, at 98–99; Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems
and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY
JOURNAL 1 (2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Auton
omous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf; Noel E. Sharkey, Autonomous Robots and the
Automation of Warfare, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW MAGAZINE, Issue 2, 2012, at
18; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS
(2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload
_0_0.pdf.
5. Robert Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot: Ethical Issues in the Design of Unmanned
Systems for Military Applications, 15 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS 169 (2009); Robert
Sparrow, Robotic Weapons and the Future of War, in NEW WARS AND NEW SOLDIERS:
MILITARY ETHICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 117 (Jessica Wolfendale & Paolo
Tripodi eds., 2011).
6. Donald P. Brutzman et al., Run-Time Ethics Checking for Autonomous Unmanned
Vehicles: Developing a Practical Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON UNMANNED UNTETHERED SUBMERSIBLE TECHNOLOGY (UUST) (2013),
available at https://savage.nps.edu/AuvWorkbench/website/documentation/papers/
UUST2013PracticalRuntimeAUVEthics.pdf; Marcello Guarini & Paul Bello, Robotic
Warfare: Some Challenges in Moving from Noncivilian to Civilian Theaters, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 129 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012);
Schmitt, supra note 4.
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A closely related but much more complex question is whether AWS are
likely to be capable of complying with the jus in bello requirements of distinction and proportionality.7 Jus in bello is that portion of Just War Theory
that is concerned with the legitimacy of the means used in fighting wars.
(Very) roughly speaking, the principle of distinction requires that attacks
only be directed at combatants, while proportionality requires that the military advantage aimed at by an attack justifies the foreseeable evils as a result
of it, especially—but not exclusively—any civilian casualties it might cause.
As I have also discussed elsewhere, whether robots will ever be capable of
making the required proportionality calculations remains highly controversial.8
However, in this article, I wish to focus on a particular aspect of this
larger problem, which has to date received almost no discussion in the published literature, being the question of the capacity of AWS to recognize
surrender, and its implications for the ethical deployment of AWS.9 Importantly, given my disciplinary origins in philosophy and applied ethics,
my concern here is solely with the ethics of the use of AWS; I leave the
question of the legality of their use in various contexts to those better qualified to answer it. As I outline in Section II, a fundamental requirement of
the jus in bello principle of distinction in Just War Theory is that combatants
should not attack enemy units that have clearly indicated their desire to surrender. By ceasing to participate in hostilities and signaling surrender, military units can acquire the moral status of non-combatants, such that deliberate attacks on them are no longer permissible. In section III, I argue that
even if robots can distinguish between military and civilian objects they

7. Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787, 788–90 (2012); Markus Wagner, Taking Humans out of the
Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law, 21 JOURNAL OF LAW INFORMATION
AND SCIENCE 155 (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 3, 24–26, 30–34.
8. Sparrow, supra note 3. See also Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare,
supra note 7, at 789–90; Wagner, supra note 7.
9. In conversation, George Lucas has suggested to me that the question of whether
robots might be able to recognize surrender and, if so, how, was in fact one of the first
questions to arise in discussions regarding AWS in U.S. military ethics and policy circles.
Although Marchant et al. mentions the difficulties involved in recognizing surrender
(Marchant et al., supra note 3) and Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Fielding flags the issues with
which this article is concerned (Marcus Fielding, Robotics in Future Land Warfare, 3
AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 1 (2006), to my knowledge this article is the first in-depth
treatment of the ethical issues raised by the problem of surrender recognition.
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may struggle to recognize surrender.10 The perceptual task of recognizing
the actions that signal surrender is likely to be significantly harder than the
task of identifying military objects, while the contextual nature of the signals used to indicate surrender implies that robots will need to be able to
interpret and identify human intentions, which is a harder task again. In
Section IV, I suggest three possible standards of reliability in surrender
recognition that we might require of robots, and discuss their implications
for the question of when robots will meet them. In Section V, after examining a number of possible ways to avoid problems that might arise as a
result of the limited capacities of AWS to recognize surrender, I argue that
none of them are likely to entirely succeed. In Section VI, I discuss the ethics of the use of AWS that cannot reliably recognize surrender and suggest
that thinking about two different sorts of cases may usefully clarify the issues involved. We might think of AWS as being kept either on a “tight” or
a “long” leash, depending upon how much opportunity they have for independent operations between release and impact. I also discuss several analogies that might assist us in thinking about these questions. In the final section, I draw out some of the implications of my discussion for the larger
debate about the ethics of AWS and, in particular, for the vexed questions
of whether it is more appropriate to think of these systems as weapons or
as platforms and the locus of responsibility for civilian (and other) casualties caused by them.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SURRENDER RECOGNITION

There is a powerful ethical case for conventions of war fighting that allow
troops who wish to withdraw from participation in hostilities to surrender,
which is that it greatly reduces the evils of war. Not only does it spare the
lives of those who wish to surrender but it also saves the lives of those on
the victorious side of the engagement who otherwise might have been
killed had combat continued. These benefits—but especially the latter
one—also establish a strong pragmatic grounds for troops to be willing to
accept surrender and to support the development of expectations that will
allow this practice.
The institution of surrender is so long established and fundamental to
the ethics of war that it is actually under-represented in the law of war. In
10. There is also a question about the capacity of AWS to accept surrender, which has
been neglected as well. However, for reasons of space I will not address this issue here
except in passing where it is relevant to the purposes of the article.
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most statutes, surrender is mentioned only obliquely in connection with the
offence of perfidy and in passing as one of the circumstances in which
combatants may become hors de combat and thus no longer legitimate targets
of attack.11 Nevertheless, Article 41 of Additional Protocol I, discussing
“[s]afeguard of an enemy hors de combat,” clearly states that:
1. A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be
recognized to be ‘hors de combat’ shall not be made the object of attack.

And clarifies that:
2. A person is ‘hors de combat’ if:
...
(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender . . .
...
provided that . . . he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to
escape.12

Correspondingly, that it is profoundly morally wrong to attack an enemy
who has surrendered is a fundamental tenet of the customary international
law of war and is almost universally acknowledged in the military law,
codes and rules of operations promulgated by States.13 Moreover, Article
23(d) of the Hague Regulations prohibits ordering that no quarter should be
given, while Article 40 of Additional Protocol I forbids “conducting hostilities
on the basis of a no survivors policy and threatening the enemy that there
shall be no survivors.”14
11. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 165–66 (2012).
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 41, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 443 (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
13. See Rule 47. Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat, ICRC, https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule47 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015). See also Practice Relating to Rule 47: Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/cust
omary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).
14. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 12,
at 422; Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 40; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 145 (2004).
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Thus, that there is both a legal requirement, and an ethical obligation,
to refrain from attacking targets that have indicated the desire to surrender
is abundantly clear.
III.

WHY THE RECOGNITION OF SURRENDER
IS A HARD PROBLEM FOR ROBOTS

If AWS are unable to recognize surrender, then this suggests that their deployment may be ethically problematic. There is no reason, in principle,
why recognition of surrender should be impossible for robots: if human
beings can do it, then so too, theoretically, could an appropriately sophisticated machine. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why recognizing surrender is likely to be difficult for robots for perhaps the next several decades. The first relates to the fact that perception is itself a notoriously hard
task for computers. The second relates to the contextual nature of the
means used to signal surrender in different circumstances.
A. The Problem of Perception
When robots were first being developed it was widely believed that the
main challenge would be to get them to solve meaningful problems, to reason and to “plan.” However, it turned out that it was actually perception—
the ability to form a model of the world and to locate themselves within it
based upon information from their sensors—that robots struggled with
and that has constituted the main obstacle to their use in more than a
handful of roles.15 Despite significant progress in addressing this problem
in recent years, robust real-time object recognition across a range of environments by systems in motion, in natural lighting conditions, remains beyond the capacity of even the most sophisticated computer vision systems.
Object recognition and classification will be particularly difficult in military
applications given that wars often take place in complex and chaotic environments, in various lighting conditions, and with smoke and fog obstructing the views of combatants.16
The difficulty robots have with building up an accurate picture of the
world is one of the reasons that some critics have been cynical about the
capacity of AWS to reliably distinguish between military and civilian tar15. RODNEY A. BROOKS, ROBOT: THE FUTURE OF FLESH AND MACHINES 36–37
(2002).
16. KRISHNAN, supra note 3, at 98.
705

Twenty Seconds to Comply

Vol. 91

gets.17 However, as I suggested above, this problem may be soluble in some
contexts. While perception in general remains a hard problem, recognition
of specific items of interest in a scene (say, for instance, an enemy battle
tank) is much more manageable. Indeed, some plausible targets for AWS,
including submarines, naval vessels, fighter aircraft and radar installations,
have distinguishing features that make recognizing them comparatively
easy. Even the task of identifying enemy troops may be amenable to solution, for instance, by identifying every human body sized infrared heatsignature within half a meter of a shortwave radar reflection characteristic
of a firearm as an enemy soldier. Of course, this is only half of what is necessary in order for AWS to be able to identify the presence of objects and
persons relevant to the requirements of jus in bello. In order to be able to
refrain from attacks that would cause disproportionate civilian casualties, a
robot must also be capable of identifying the presence of civilians and nonmilitary objects in the battlespace. Again, however, I suspect that this problem may not be beyond the capacities of robots in some contexts. In antisubmarine warfare, for instance, there are highly unlikely to be any civilian
targets that might be mistaken for an enemy submarine. Indeed, war at sea
more often—if not always—occurs far from civilian shipping, while the
existence of unique acoustic profiles for every ship provides an obvious
mechanism whereby (some) robots might recognize both civilian and military shipping. Similarly, air-to-air combat may often proceed without concerns about causing collateral damage.
In any case, my aim here is not to settle the question of whether computers are likely to be able to meet these challenges but to point out that,
even if they can, a further and significant challenge remains. Given the
prohibition on attacking those who have surrendered, robots must also be
capable of perceiving the changes in orientation and force posture of combatants that are conventionally associated with the indication of surrender.
This is a much more difficult task. It is one thing, for instance, to be able to
pick out human beings in a scene and identify them as enemy soldiers, it is
another—and much more difficult—to tell when they have dropped their
weapons, left cover, and put their hands up. In order to be able to recognize surrender, robots will not just need to be able to recognize possible
targets but also to recognize what they are doing.

17. Id. at 98–99; Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, supra note 7, at
788; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 31–33.
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B. The Significance of Context
In fact, recognizing surrender is more difficult than even this description
suggests. The actions that indicate surrender vary with context, both internationally, and also amongst different types of military units.18 For this reason—and given the possibility that the forces involved in a conflict may be
operating with different understandings as to the relevant conventions—
recognizing surrender is fundamentally a question of recognizing an intention. Indeed, recognizing surrender requires the capacity to identify the
presence or absence of a number of intentions. First, surrendering involves
the intent to cease to participate in hostilities and to place oneself under the
control of enemy troops. Second, it involves the intention to signal this so
that others perceive the first intention. However, there is a further intention that is necessary to surrender, which is the intention to make it such
that a failure to perceive the intent to cease to participate in hostilities
would be negligent or unreasonable. This third intention is necessary because there is a “performative” aspect to surrender.19 That is, as long as
certain “felicity conditions” are met—most obviously that one has the genuine intent to cease fighting—the indication of surrender just is surrender
and, as if by magic, transforms one from being a legitimate target of attack
to an illegitimate target. In order that such a miraculous transformation can
be achieved, the indication of surrender must have the declarative force
aimed at by this third intention.
Human beings have a tremendously sophisticated and powerful capacity to interpret the actions of other human beings and to identify their intentions—to “read minds”—which has been honed by millennia of primate evolution wherein the ability to know what other individuals were
thinking and were about to do provided a crucial selective advantage.20 It
will be extremely challenging indeed for any machine to come close to replicating this.
The problem of surrender recognition is especially hard—and the role
of context especially important—because of the relationship between sur18. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MILITARY ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH CASE STUDIES
229 (2013).
19. JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
20. Chris D. Frith, The Social Brain?, 362 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 671 (2007); David Premack & Guy Woodruff,
Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?, 1 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 515
(1978).
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render and “perfidy.” Essentially, perfidy is the attempt to manipulate the
laws of war to one’s own military advantage in a fashion that would, were it
to become widely practiced, undercut respect for those laws and, in particular, mean that it would be unreasonable to expect one’s enemy to be
bound by them in the future.21 Feigned surrender is a paradigmatic case of
perfidy.22 If troops who have indicated the desire to surrender recommence
hostilities once the enemy has rendered themselves vulnerable by ceasing
firing or moving so as to accept surrender then the opposing forces are
unlikely to respect indications of surrender in the future. Because the institution of surrender is so valuable, but also so vulnerable to being undercut
in this fashion, all parties to a conflict also have very strong reasons to punish instances of perfidy where they occur.
The possibility of perfidious indications of surrender means that not
only must robots be capable of recognizing the conventional indicators of
surrender but they also must be capable of distinguishing between real and
feigned intentions. There are circumstances in which it is legitimate to attack enemy forces who are acting in a way that would ordinarily clearly indicate a desire to surrender—when it is reasonable to conclude that, in fact,
their intent is perfidious.23 However, the task of assessing whether a signaled intention is likely to be perfidious or not is significantly more difficult
than the task of recognizing the signal in the first place.
Of course if a unit indicates “surrender” to an AWS and then begins
firing immediately after the AWS has aborted its attack, it is plausible to
think that the weapon would be capable of recognizing this as perfidy.
However, the point is that in order to launch an attack on the same unit
when it “surrendered” again one would have to be extremely confident indeed of the original identification of a (feigned) surrender and also that the
target’s intentions were the same in this case. That is, one would have to be
confident that the actions that one originally took to indicate surrender
were indeed intended to convey that intention duplicitously and that this
subsequent indication of surrender was motivated by the same intentions.
Yet distinguishing real from feigned intentions where a target has indicated
surrender is a very difficult task indeed.
If a weapon was not capable of recognizing perfidy then it would be
extremely vulnerable to being spoofed in this manner: potential targets
would simply indicate surrender the moment they were vulnerable to being
21. DINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 198–208.
22. Id. at 200.
23. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 235.
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attacked in order to be spared and then recommence hostilities as soon as
the AWS had moved away.24 Such a response would be unethical and illegal
but might go unremarked and unpunished unless the AWS was capable of
recording/and or transmitting footage of their activities so it would be seen
by human beings who might recognize it as perfidy and prosecute it as
such. If the AWS were unable to transmit data to another location at the
time then such instances of perfidious surrender might even go unpunished
if the AWS was destroyed during the course of the engagement.
The contextual nature of the signals used to indicate surrender and the
conceptual connection between surrender and perfidy mean that it will be
extremely difficult for robots to recognize surrender in many contexts.
IV.

HOW RELIABLE MUST A ROBOT BE?

Of course, human beings often fail to recognize surrender in war, with
tragic results. It might therefore be argued that all that is required of robots
in order to avoid any ethical problems arising out of the difficulties of recognizing surrender is that they should be capable of doing so at least as
well as human warfighters. Once a robot can meet this standard, it will be
no more likely to attack a surrendered target than would be a human warfighter; once it exceeds it, replacing human warfighters with robots in the
same role will save the lives of (some) surrendered troops.25
24. If—as seems likely—AWS are unable to accept surrender by taking surrendered
forces into custody, this may further complicate the proper interpretation of intentions. If
the enemy knows that AWS have no capacity to take them prisoner, they might well surrender to an AWS, knowing when they do so that this will serve to protect them from
attack while having no implications for their long-term capacity to participate in the armed
conflict. Moreover, if there is no manned unit nearby capable of taking them prisoner,
they would indeed be within their rights to take up arms to rejoin the conflict after a reasonable period of time has elapsed. However, awareness of this possibility might in turn
lead the parties to a conflict to suspect all indications of surrender to AWS as perfidious,
which would be disastrous. My thanks to Dr. Shane Dunn of the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation for drawing my attention to this issue.
If one believes that it is not possible to surrender unless there is a unit capable of accepting the surrender and taking effective control of the surrendered forces as Coleman
indicates (id. at 233), then in all likelihood it would be impossible to surrender to an AWS.
This would absolve these systems of any requirement of being capable of recognizing surrender, but arguably at the cost of rendering them unethical in a wide range of roles. This
will be discussed further below.
25. Ronald Arkin, Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-Combatant 137
AISB QUARTERLY 1 (2013).
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However, as I will argue further below, this claim is properly controversial: we might well expect more of robots than this. To avoid prejudging
this controversy, then, let me stipulate that, in what follows, I will use the
term “reliable surrender recognition” to mean whatever standard would be
required in order to avoid the specific set of ethical issues that might arise
as a result of any inability of AWS to detect surrender. With this stipulation
in hand we can then proceed to examine the question of precisely where
this standard should be set, which in turn will determine the likelihood that
robots will be capable of achieving it within any given time frame.
There are, I think, at least two—but arguably three—places at which
we might fix the standard for “reliability” in surrender recognition.
As suggested above, we might judge robots reliable when they achieve
or approach the performance of actual human warfighters in the field when
it comes to the recognition of surrender: call this first standard, the “empirical standard of human warfighters.”26
Importantly though, we already expect more than this of human warfighters. The actual performance of human beings in wartime is inevitably
significantly less than our moral expectations with regard to surrender
recognition because in reality human beings are sometimes negligent in
their efforts to determine whether an enemy has surrendered or perhaps do
not even bother to try to do so. At the very least, what we expect of human
warfighters is that they make every reasonable effort to determine whether
or not enemy troops have surrendered before they attack them. Thus, we
might judge robots reliable at surrender recognition when they reach or
approach the standard of performance of human beings who are meeting
their moral obligations in this regard: call this second possible place at
which to fix the standard for reliability the “reasonable expectation standard.”
However, it might be argued that the reasonable expectation standard
mistakes an account of how we should evaluate agents for an account of
their obligations. While we may not wish to blame or condemn warfighters
who fail to meet this standard, what warfighters are actually required to do
is to never attack a surrendered target. We might therefore only judge robots
reliable at recognizing surrender when they approach 100 percent accuracy
in the task of recognizing which enemy forces have surrendered and which
26. Arkin suggests and defends this standard eloquently, albeit in the context of a discussion of the general requirement to target only combatants rather than the question of
surrender recognition in particular. See id.; Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned
Systems, supra note 3.
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have not: call this third—most demanding—standard, the standard of
“perfection.”27
How hard it will be for robots to detect surrender reliably—and consequently when they are likely to be able to do so—will depend upon which
of these standards we believe is appropriate. Those who proffer a consequentialist account of the justification of the principles of jus in bello should
clearly favor the first of these standards; once robots can meet this standard their use will reduce the evils of war. However, those who are inclined
to understand the principle of distinction, in particular, as justified by a
Kantian ethics or by deontological concerns more generally,28 should favor
at least the reasonable expectation standard and might be tempted to insist
on (near) perfect recognition. To insist on the reasonable expectation
standard is just to insist that we do not owe surrendered combatants any
less when we send a robot rather than a human being into combat. The
case for expecting (near) perfect recognition from robots is more tendentious but still, I think, arguable. Despite their extraordinary capabilities,
human beings are cognitively limited systems with an even more limited set
of perceptual powers. In contrast, there is no obvious upper limit on the
performance of a machine at recognizing objects or intentions. When it
comes to the appropriate ethical standards to impose on the performance
of robots, then, there is no reason why we should take the performance of
human beings as definitive. Given that surrendered combatants have a
right to be protected entirely against attack, it might be argued that this is the
appropriate standard to demand of a machine.29
I am not going to attempt to settle here which of these is the appropriate standard to expect of robots when it comes to reliability at surrender
recognition, which is a matter best settled in the context of a larger debate
about the standards of ethical performance we should expect of robots.
However, given the challenges involved in recognizing surrender, discussed
above, even if we settle for the lowest of these, the empirical standard of
27. As the concept of reliability allows for the possibility of occasional failures, it is
not plausible to demand perfect accuracy in order to judge a system reliable. However, near
perfect accuracy is a plausible—if demanding—standard of reliability in some contexts.
28. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 123
(1972).
29. Again, given that it is impossible to demonstrate that a system is 100 percent reliable (even if a system has never failed, it remains possible that it will do so in the future), it
seems that in practice we must settle for near-perfect performance even where morality
demands perfection.
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human warfighters, it may be some time yet before robots are capable of
reliably recognizing surrender.
V.

FOUR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS?

Thus far I have been concerned to establish only that detecting surrender is
likely to be difficult for AWS and consequently that they may be unable to
do so reliably for some years or perhaps even decades. It does not (yet) follow from this that their use would be unethical. In particular, if it is plausible to assign responsibility for the task of determining whether a target has
surrendered or not to the person who launches the weapon, the inability of
the weapon itself to detect surrender may pose no barrier to its ethical use.
On the other hand, as I will discuss further below, for weapons with a long
loiter time or a large degree of independence when it comes to determining
which target they will attack, we might wonder whether this solution is
available.
However, before turning to examine these questions, I want to first
consider four different sets of policy responses, which, if successful, might
avoid the need to confront them. Requiring AWS to seek permission from
a human controller before initiating an attack would prevent the need for
the weapon itself to be able to recognize surrender. Radically constraining
the nature of possible targets of AWS or the munitions they could deploy,
revising conventions regarding surrender so that all military units carried
“surrender beacons,” or confining the use of AWS to particular domains
might either make it much easier for robots to recognize surrender or mitigate the need for them to do so.
A. Requiring Permission to Attack from a Human Controller
The desire to placate widespread public unease about the prospect of robots being granted the power to kill, plus the widely acknowledged difficulties involved in producing “ethical” robots, have led a number of commentators to suggest that autonomous weapon systems could be required to
seek permission from a human controller or supervisor before deploying
lethal munitions, or at least before deploying them in cases where the ethi-
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cal deliberation required to determine whether or not an attack is permissible is beyond the capacities of the robot.30
However, there are two obvious difficulties with this proposal as a solution to the problems involved in surrender recognition. First, unless the
robot was required to seek permission before each and every attack, this
would not avoid the problems associated with the possibility of false negatives (that is, where the robot wrongly decides that a target is not surrendering—and is therefore a legitimate target). Second, and more importantly, requiring robots to seek permission from human beings before attacking
targets would render them unable to carry out attacks in circumstances
where communications were denied or otherwise unavailable or where the
tempo of battle means that human beings cannot make good decisions in
the time available to them. As the capacity to operate in environments
where communications are unavailable or unreliable31 and to make decisions faster than human beings32 are two of the main advantages of AWS
over manned and tele-operated systems, sacrificing these would mean sacrificing many of the benefits of AWS. Indeed, a system that required permission from a human operator before it could attack a target would not be
able to “select and engage targets without a human operator” and would
therefore not constitute an autonomous weapon system according to the
definition I cited above when operated in this fashion.
B. Radically Constrain the Nature of Possible Targets or the Munitions Deployed by
AWS?
Another workaround, which would allow AWS to operate across a wide
range of domains but that might avoid ethical problems associated with any
inability of AWS to recognize surrender, would be to radically constrain the
30. Asaro, supra note 3, at 702; Brutzman et al., supra note 6; James R. Fitzsimonds &
Thomas G. Mahnken, Military Officer Attitudes toward UAV Adoption: Exploring Institutional
Impediments to Innovation, 46 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 96, 101, 103 (2007); Hyder Gulam
& Simon W. Lee, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles and the Law of Armed Conflict, 3
AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL 123, 132 (2006); Henry S. Kenyon, Israel Deploys Robot
Guardians, 60 SIGNAL 41, 43 (2006); Alex Leveringhaus & Tjerk de Greef, Autonomous
Weapons: A Qualified Defence, in PRECISION-STRIKE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION: STRATEGIC, LEGAL AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS 206 (Mike Aaronson et
al. eds., 2014).
31. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 3, at 7; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 3, at 238.
32. Thomas K. Adams, Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,
PARAMETERS, Winter 2001, at 57.
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targets AWS were tasked to attack, or the sorts of weapons with which they
were armed. John Canning, who was (and is) an influential figure in the
initial debate about the ethics of AWS in U.S. policy circles, was an early
and strong advocate of this option.33 In order to minimize the chance of
attacking a surrendered force, AWS might be programmed to attack only:
(1) other unmanned systems; (2) forces that are actively firing their weapons at the time; or, (3) the enemy’s weapons rather than persons or (whole)
systems. Alternatively, we might only arm autonomous weapon systems
with non-lethal weapons so as to avoid the risk of killing surrendered
troops. While each of these possible solutions has its merits, unfortunately
they either do not succeed entirely in removing the need for AWS to be
able to recognize surrender, or they very seriously restrict the nature of the
operations that AWS could carry out and therefore their military utility—or
both.
The idea that wars of the future might be confined to battles between
robots frequently comes up in discussions of the ethics of AWS, although
in my experience it often reflects the desire to avoid engaging seriously
with these issues rather than any real faith that such a circumstance will
ever come about. Nevertheless, if AWS were tasked only with attacking
other unmanned systems, it is true that this would avoid any need to be
able to recognize surrender, as presumably there is no moral requirement
not to attack “surrendered” targets except in the case where human lives
are directly at stake.34 The obvious cost of this solution, however, would be
to massively restrict the military utility of AWS. Indeed, if AWS could only
ethically be deployed against other AWS, there would be little incentive to
develop such weapons in the first place.
Similarly, enemy units that are actively firing their weapons have clearly
not surrendered and so concerns about the risks of attacking surrendered
33. John S. Canning, A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems, 3RD
ANNUAL DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE, Washington, DC 2006, available at
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006disruptive_tech/canning.pdf; John S. Canning, You’ve Just
Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, 28 IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE 12
(2009).
34. Of course, this approach substitutes the problem of distinguishing between
manned and unmanned systems for the problem of recognizing surrender. In some contexts, the former task may not be straightforward. For instance, robotic tanks may look
very much like manned tanks. For that matter, in the future many military systems may
have the capacity to function either as manned or unmanned systems. However, if it were
possible to be confident that a potential target was unmanned, then there need be little
hesitation in attacking it.
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troops pose no barrier to attacking them. Again, however, restricting operations of AWS in this way would sacrifice a good portion of their military
potential. One imagines that enemy troops would quickly learn to stop firing when AWS were within striking range—and it would be entirely ethical
for them to do so; it is not perfidious to cease firing when confronted by
superior enemy force in the hope of escaping their attention or of not being judged worthy of attack in the circumstances. While a weapon that
could effectively suppress enemy fire merely by loitering in the area would
have significant military utility, such a weapon could still not play a number
of other militarily valuable roles, including attacking units that were strategically emplaced or maneuvering.
Targeting only enemy weapons or deploying only non-lethal munitions
from AWS would not reduce the difficulty of determining whether or not
an enemy unit wishes to surrender, but would reduce the risk of killing surrendered troops.35 Unfortunately, because neither of these policies would
reduce this risk to zero, they do not mitigate the requirement not to attack
surrendered units. Any projectile or energy emission powerful enough to
disable an enemy’s weapons will usually impose some risk to human life.
For instance, even low-energy kinetic attacks on artillery pieces, tank cannon, or the missile rails of aircraft, risk killing their crew, while attacking
naval guns may hole the ship and endanger the lives of everyone on board.
“Non-lethal” weapons are better described as “sub-lethal” since almost all
carry some risk of killing people in particular circumstances.36 Rubber bullets may strike people in the temples or eye sockets, gases may cause asthmatics to asphyxiate, microwave-based area denial weapons may cause
heart attacks or burns on those who are unable to leave the area of effect
for some reason, etc. For these reasons, forces that have surrendered have
the right not to be attacked even with weapons of this sort.37

35. See Canning, A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems, supra note 33;
Canning, You’ve Just Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, supra note 33.
36. In fairness to Canning, in his publications he imagines AWS being armed with
weapons that are capable of disarming soldiers without harming them (he mentions, for
instance, the use of diamond tip saws to destroy rifles): my point here is effectively to dispute the likelihood and practicality of this scenario in practice.
37. Presuming that they are complying with the reasonable directives of the forces to
whom they have surrendered.
715

Twenty Seconds to Comply

Vol. 91

C. Surrender Beacons?
To this point I have been discussing how an AWS might recognize surrender and presuming (if implicitly) that, if they cannot do so reliably, this may
exclude their use in some circumstances. However, the history of warfare
contains many examples of weapons that were morally controversial when
first invented nevertheless being deployed for the sake of military advantage, whereupon the way in which wars are fought and the legal and ethical conventions governing military conduct each evolved to take account
of the new weapons. With this history in mind, then, one might instead
frame the ethical question as “What are the obligations on military forces
as a result of the need to clearly convey surrender to AWS with the limitations I have described above, given that in all probability these weapons
will be deployed in a wide range of roles in future conflicts?”
One option would be to insist that troops should be capable of communicating surrender to AWS. For instance, were all military units to carry
electronic devices capable of emitting an internationally agreed upon “surrender signal” on an agreed-upon frequency, then activating this beacon
would serve to protect them from attack by AWS should they wish to surrender. It is perhaps plausible to imagine such a system being fitted to aircraft, naval systems, and armored units, where it would also have the advantage of facilitating surrender to human forces. Unfortunately, however,
it is a bit more of a stretch to imagine every infantry unit in the world carrying such a device, let alone every soldier—and it is wildly implausible to
imagine that irregular militias and insurgents will have the resources to
equip their members with an electronic beacon in order to facilitate surrender to AWS. While there are, of course, questions about the proprietary of
the participation of such forces in armed conflict, where they are involved
it is both morally incumbent and politically advantageous to be able to recognize and accept their surrender. At most then, such a convention would
only be a partial solution to the problem of surrender recognition and
might succeed only in conflicts involving regular forces on both sides.38

38. Radio beacons—and a convention regarding their use—would solve another problem that is likely to beset (some) autonomous systems, which is the need to be able to
reliably identify military ships that have taken on the role of hospital ships: it is much
more plausible to expect that any ship that wishes to cease to participate in hostilities in
order to take on board and care for the wounded should begin broadcasting a signal indicating that it is doing so. Similarly, beacons might also help to protect other civilian instal716
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Moreover, the introduction of such beacons would only solve the
problem posed by the introduction of AWS if it was accompanied by a further radical modification of existing conventions regarding surrender,
which we should countenance only after careful deliberation, if at all. That
is, it would have to become an established understanding that military units
remain legitimate targets unless they have activated their beacons, with all
other means of surrender ruled out. Otherwise, AWS would still need to be
capable of recognizing surrender by (all the various) conventional means.
Adopting such a policy would obviously be disastrous for any troops who
had been separated from their surrender beacons or whose surrender beacons had become inoperable for some reason, as they would then be unable to surrender to an AWS.
Whether such a circumstance—and the policy that produced it—would
be acceptable or not is, I think, a contestable matter. On the one hand, as
noted above, it is explicitly forbidden to order that there should be “no
quarter given,” which suggest that it would be problematic to deploy a
weapon that might attack troops who were clearly—if not to the machine—indicating the desire to surrender. On the other hand, no person or
policy can guarantee that every attempt to surrender will be successful:
there will always be—tragic—situations where signals are missed or intentions misunderstood. It might therefore be argued that providing AWS
with the capacity to recognize surrender beacons in the context of a convention which requires military units to carry such beacons exhausted the
obligations of the designers of these weapons.
D. Confining the Use of AWS to Particular Domains
Like excluding the presence of civilian objects, recognizing surrender is a
more tractable problem in some sorts of warfare than others. It is extremely difficult when targeting infantry or irregular forces in urban or jungle
environments because both the difficulties posed by perception and by the
importance of context are at their most acute in this setting. Yet it is effectively non-existent in air-to-air combat, where there are currently no widely-agreed upon mechanisms to allow aircraft to surrender. In several other
types of warfare, the conventions regarding surrender make it much more
plausible to think that robots could recognize surrender with a high degree
lations such as churches, hospitals, et cetera, from inadvertent attack by AWS. My thanks
to Tim McCormack for drawing my attention to this possibility.
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of accuracy. In combat between armored vehicles, for instance, units that
wish to indicate surrender typically reverse the turret of the tank, open the
crew hatches, and place themselves on top of—or alongside of—the vehicle. It is plausible to think that robots might be capable of recognizing
this.39 In operations conducted against submarines, submarines surrender
by communicating their intentions via “underwater telephone” or by surfacing and flying a white flag while the crew takes to the deck or the boats,
which again robots might be capable of recognizing.40 The flags and lights
that naval vessels use to indicate surrender are also the sorts of signals that
machines are already reasonably competent at detecting and interpreting.
Thus, by confining AWS to roles in which they are tasked with attacking
only targets of these sorts, it would be possible either to avoid the problems associated with recognizing surrender (in the case of air-to-air combat) or to make it much more likely that robots could recognize surrender.
Of the possible policy solutions I have considered here, this is the one
that I believe offers the best prospects of allowing AWS to play a valuable
military role without courting ethical controversy due to an inability to recognize surrender.41 However, even this approach is likely to significantly
restrict the sorts of warfare in which AWS could be used.
VI.

IF ROBOTS CANNOT RELIABLY RECOGNIZE SURRENDER . . .

None of the approaches I have surveyed thus far succeed, therefore, in
avoiding the ethical issues associated with a lack of capacity to reliably recognize surrender without imposing severe restrictions on the roles in which
they may be used. Of course, it might also be possible to combine the various approaches I have discussed here in different ways in order to allow
AWS to operate in more domains or attack a wider variety of targets whilst
still (mostly) being able to recognize surrender. For reasons of space I cannot consider all the possible options here. However, I hope my discussion
of the promise and limitations of each approach will prove useful to such a
project.
39. Admittedly, this does not resolve the problems arising out of the possibility of
perfidious surrender.
40. My thanks to Rob McLaughlin for clarifying these conventions for me.
41. Note that this was effectively the approach adopted with the United States’ MK
60 CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) antisubmarine mine, which arguably should be classified as an autonomous weapon system: as this weapon was designed to target only enemy
submarines underwater, there was very little risk that it would attack a surrendered target.
718

International Law Studies

2015

For the remainder of this article, I wish to consider the ethics of deploying AWS that cannot reliably recognize surrender. I want to suggest
that two different ways of framing this issue produce very different results.
In cases where there is a limited window of opportunity for targets to surrender between an AWS being released and its impact, the necessity for the
AWS to be able to recognize surrender is greatly diminished: I will refer to
this as the AWS being “on a tight leash.”42 However, in cases where the
AWS may travel or loiter for a significant period between release and destruction of its target or (perhaps) where the AWS has a high degree of autonomy regarding which particular target it will attack, the requirement that
the AWS be capable of reliably detecting surrender is much more pressing:
I will refer to this as the AWS being “on a long leash.” Moreover, I suggest,
there are existing or historical analogies that are foregrounded by adopting
each approach. Thus, we may be able to make significant progress on resolving the ethics of the use of AWS if we can decide which of these ways
of framing is more appropriate in any particular case.
A. AWS on a Tight Leash?
Where AWS travel at very high speeds (or where they are used at short
range) and where they are tasked with selecting amongst a small number of
targets that are already under direct observation when the AWS is
launched, it might be argued that there is no need for the AWS to be capable of recognizing surrender. Instead, it would be up to the human being
who launches the AWS to ensure that any of the potential targets were not
signaling surrender before they release the AWS.
The plausibility of this approach is suggested by consideration of a hypothetical scenario involving a weapon that has been in operation for nearly a century—a “dumb” torpedo—or, perhaps more plausibly, another
contemporary weapon—a “fire-and-forget” torpedo with an active sonar
homing system. Because such weapons may travel in the water for a number of minutes between firing and reaching their target, it is theoretically
42. I have struggled to find a form of words to describe the ultimate destructive effects of the operations of AWS on its target that does not prejudice the question of
whether the AWS is a weapon with which the operator attacks a target or a system or platform which itself launches an attack on the target, which is a question I wish to leave open
in this article. I have therefore settled for speaking of the “impact” or “strike” of an AWS
but it is important to emphasize that I understand these expressions to include cases
where the AWS itself launches a sub-munition to destroy a target.
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possible that the enemy vessel being targeted might indicate surrender between the launch of the weapon and its impact.43 Were such a thing to
happen, the destruction of the surrendered vessel would be a tragedy, but
not a war crime. As long as the target was a legitimate target when the
weapon was launched and had made no indication that it wished to surrender or (perhaps) was about to surrender, then the person who authorized
the release of the weapon bears no moral responsibility for the tragic outcome. Moreover, while we might wish that it were possible to abort the
torpedo’s run once it became apparent that the target had surrendered, it
does not seem as though there is any ethical problem arising from the fact
that the torpedo itself is not capable of recognizing surrender and aborting
its attack. If we believe that this is an appropriate analogy than it may seem
that an inability to detect surrender need not prohibit the ethical use of
AWS.
B. AWS on a Long Leash?
While weapons systems capable of choosing between a limited number of
targets and operating over a narrow timeframe will qualify as AWS, there is
a sense in which they are not “very” autonomous. Much of the military potential of AWS consists in their (theoretical) capacity to operate with very
long loiter times and to engage targets of opportunity that may not have
been explicitly singled out for attack when the system was launched. We
might therefore think of such systems as operating on a “long leash.” A
paradigmatic example of an AWS operated on a long leash, for instance,
might involve an autonomous hunter-killer Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
(UUV) tasked with attacking all military shipping within some geographically defined (wide) area.44
43. Unclassified sources suggest that the U.S.’s Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedo
might travel for as long as forty minutes between launch and impact when used to attack a
target at maximum range (see range and speed figures given at Background Information: Mk
48 ADCAP, JANE’S NAVAL FORCES (Feb. 2, 2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20010
401035621/http:/www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/juws/juws010202_1_n.sh
tml), while several of the heavyweight torpedoes fielded by other nations might travel for
approximately thirty minutes (Malcolm Fuller, Silent Might: Heavyweight Torpedoes Still Pack a
Punch, JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL (May 27, 2010), https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPag
es/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1207877&Pubabbrev=JNI).
44. The U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) has announced its interest in providing
the U.S. Navy’s Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) with an Anti-Submarine Warfare capability (Richard Scott, ONR to Swim Ahead on ASW Package for
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Whether operating on a long leash is any different to operating on a
tight leash, morally speaking, is, I think, the central question when it comes
to the ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender.45
At the very least, the chances of a target surrendering between the
launch of the AWS and its impact are larger when AWS are operating on a
long leash. This increase is not proportional with time, as one presumes
that surrendered targets would, after some discrete period of time, be taken
into custody and exit the battlespace. Nevertheless, it is clear that AWS operating on a long leash have a significantly greater chance of encountering a
surrendered target. Moreover, the person who authorizes the release of the
AWS has little sense of whether particular targets have surrendered or are
about to surrender.
However, it might be argued that this fact does not distinguish the ethics of operating AWS on a long leash from the ethics of operating them on
a tight leash, as in each case responsibility for the consequences of the attack rest with the person who authorizes the launch of the AWS.46 According to this way of thinking, as long as the chance of striking a surrendered
target does not exceed some reasonable threshold, there will be nothing
ethically problematic about using the AWS. This calculation will need to
take into account both the capacities of the AWS to recognize surrender (in
what percentage of cases does it fail to do so?) and the chance that a target
might have surrendered between launch and impact, which in turn will depend on the AWS’s role, area of operations, and targeting criteria.
Yet, this sanguine attitude might be challenged in two ways.
First, even where the risk of attacking a surrendered target is judged acceptable, it might be argued that making this calculation is not sufficient to
count as taking “reasonable precautions” to avoid attacking surrendered
targets in the circumstances.47 When AWS are being used on a long leash,
when it comes to any particular target engaged by the AWS, no human being has assessed whether that target has surrendered or not, while (ex hyLarge UUV, JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 20, 2014), https://janes.ihs.com/Custo
mPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1729177&Pubabbrev=J
NI), which suggests that this prospect is more than hypothetical.
45. Fielding, supra note 9, at 102.
46. Schmitt, supra note 4.
47. Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(2)(a). For discussion of the nature and
significance of the obligation on warfighters to take reasonable precautions in attack, see:
DINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 125–28; A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 125–74
(3d ed. 2012).
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pothesi) the AWS itself is not capable of reliably determining this. If we understand the requirement to take reasonable precautions as being founded
in an obligation to the particular person whose life is on the line when the
attack is being contemplated, rather than as a product of a generalized obligation to avoid non-combatant casualties, then it is arguable that the calculation before launch that the AWS is unlikely to attack a surrendered target
is not sufficient to exhaust this obligation.48
Second—and relatedly—the use of AWS on a long leash might be
thought to run afoul of the prohibition on issuing orders that there should
be “no quarter” given. This objection seems especially compelling if one
believes that enemy forces cannot surrender to an AWS because the AWS
has no means of “accepting” surrender.49 If this is true then although it removes the necessity for AWS to be capable of recognizing surrender it also
would, I believe, prohibit using them on a long leash. Even if one denies—
as I believe we should—that the lack of the capacity of AWS to render enemy combatants who wish to surrender prisoners of war excuses them
from the requirement to be able to recognize surrender, the prohibition on
ordering that there shall be no quarter given might be thought to render
the use of AWS on a long leash morally problematic. In such a circumstance, enemy forces who wish to surrender may have no opportunity to
do so because the AWS fails to recognize their attempt; moreover, the person who authorized the release of the AWS was (or at least should have
been) aware of this when the system was deployed. Of course, strictly
speaking, the intention of those deploying an AWS need not be that units
should have no opportunity to surrender (they might, for example, plausibly
wish that the system they were using was more capable of recognizing surrender); rather, they are guilty of employing a means of warfare that fails to
safeguard the opportunity to surrender. Whether this objection will have
force or not in such cases will, therefore, depend on whether the prohibition on ordering that no quarter should be given is understood as requiring
combatants to safeguard the opportunity to surrender or merely not to intentionally deny it absolutely.50

48. Just how plausible it would be to attempt to ground the obligation to take reasonable precautions in attack along these lines is a further question, which reasons of space
prevent me from attempting to answer here.
49. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 233.
50. As Coleman notes, combatants are typically not held to be under an obligation to
provide enemy forces with an explicit opportunity to surrender before attacking. Id. at 237.
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According to each of these objections, then, the period of time between the release and the impact of the AWS is morally significant by virtue
of the extent to which it moves the burden of recognizing surrender from
the person authorizing the release of the AWS to the system itself.
In some ways, the issues in the debate on the ethics of operating AWS
on a “long leash” are similar to those in the historical (and ongoing) debate
about the ethics of mine warfare. Mines may detonate long after they are
emplaced and without regard to whether or not their targets have surrendered (or, indeed, are combatants at all). The lack of control that those who
emplace or lay mines have over the nature of the targets the mines attack
has led to mines becoming controversial. Anti-personnel mines are banned
by the Ottawa Convention, while, in naval warfare, the use of free-floating
contact mines that do not become harmless one hour after they are deployed is explicitly prohibited by Article 1(1) of Hague Convention VIII.51
Critics of AWS might push this analogy in order to insist that the use of
AWS on a long leash should similarly be prohibited on the grounds that
those who deploy them cannot adequately control where they strike. Enthusiasts for AWS are likely to reply that contemporary anti-tank and tethered naval influence mines are capable of a high degree of discrimination
between civilian and military targets and are not prohibited by IHL, despite
the fact that they cannot recognize surrender. While evocative, then, the
analogy with mine warfare seems unlikely to settle the question of the ethics of the use on a long leash of AWS that cannot recognize surrender.
Ultimately, I remain conflicted about such use of AWS. If the chance
of them striking a surrendered target is low enough—taking into account
both their capacity to recognize a surrendered target and the chance that
they will encounter a surrendered target given their role, area of operations,
and targeting criteria—then perhaps it would be ethical for the person authorizing the release of the AWS to accept responsibility for the consequences of its deployment, including the possibility that the system will attack a surrendered target. Yet the intuition that it would be wrong to
launch a system that might strike a target months later, regardless of
51. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 12, at 645; Convention No.
VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 12, at 103.
For discussion, see SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 171 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995).
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whether or not it had surrendered, remains. As my own thinking on this
topic remains unsettled, I can only hope that my treatment here will help
others in their thinking about these issues.
VII.

PLATFORMS, WEAPONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY

The preceding discussion intersects at a number of points with discussions
of two key controversies in the larger debate about the ethics of AWS: the
appropriate locus of moral responsibility for casualties produced by AWS;
and whether AWS should be thought of as either weapons or weapon platforms. A brief consideration of these points of intersection may, I hope,
cast some light on these questions as well as on the ethics of the use of
AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender.
One of the first controversies to erupt as the prospect of AWS
emerged concerned the question of the appropriate locus of responsibility
for deaths caused by these systems. Critics alleged that the development of
AWS risked no one being responsible for the consequences of their use. 52
The person who releases the weapon cannot be held responsible for the
choices and decisions of the robot, while the robot itself is not the sort of
thing that can be held morally responsible; thus, a “responsibility gap”
emerges.53 This claim remains contested and a number of authorities have
argued that the attribution of responsibility to the person who authorizes
the release of the weapon is, in fact, straightforward, with talk of a “responsibility gap” obfuscating this by misattributing a mysterious quasimoral agency to robots.54
Whether AWS should be thought of as weapons or platforms is controversial because of various proposals to prohibit AWS by means of international law.55 If there is, as some have argued, something especially wrong
52. Sparrow (2007), supra note 3.
53. Andreas Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of
Learning Automata, 6 ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 175 (2004); Heather M.
Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability, and Lethal Autonomous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 352 (Fritz
Allhoff, et al. eds., 2013).
54. Gert-Jan Lokhorst & Jeroen Van Den Hoven, Responsibility for Military Robots, in
ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 145, 150–51
(Patrick Lin, et al. eds., 2012); Schmitt, supra note 4, at 33.
55. Jürgen Altmann, Arms Control for Armed Uninhabited Vehicles: An Ethical Issue, 15
ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 137 (2013); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Banning
Autonomous Killing, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: HOW LEGAL AND ETHICAL
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about killing people with robots56—and robots are weapons—then it is
possible (although obviously controversial) that they should be considered
mala in se and prohibited as such.57 If, on the other hand, AWS are better
thought of as platforms (which might be used to deliver different sorts of
weapons) then it would be difficult indeed to explain how the mere fact
that a weapon was mounted on an AWS should make it an “evil means”
for killing; moreover, there is little historical precedent for banning a platform.
These two controversies are already intertwined: if we assign responsibility to the person who uses the AWS to kill, then the robot is clearly the
means by which they kill—and thus a weapon; moreover, the possibility
opens up that this means itself might be morally problematic. If AWS are
platforms then they attack targets with weapons and it is most natural to
look to assign responsibility for targeting decisions to the controller (the
computer) on the platform. However, this dialectic becomes still clearer in
the light of the preceding discussion of the ethics of surrender recognition.
Notice, for instance, how my treatment of the ethics of the use of AWS
on a tight leash assigns responsibility to the person who launches the AWS
and treats AWS as analogous to other weapons, which might also occasionally strike surrendered targets. Yet this has a number of challenging implications for the ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize
surrender. If AWS are weapons, then launching an AWS is launching an
attack. Moreover, it seems most natural to think of this as launching an attack against all of the targets that the AWS might in fact strike.58 If including a military unit within the targeting criteria of an AWS counts as attacking that unit, though, then the chance of attacking a surrendered target in-

NORMS CHANGE 224 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014); About Us,
CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/about-us/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2015); Wendell Wallach & Colin Allen, Framing Robot Arms Control, 15
ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 125 (2013); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 4.
56. Asaro, supra note 3; Mark Gubrud, Stopping Killer Robots, 70 BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 32, 40 (2014); Sharkey, supra note 4.
57. Wendell Wallach, Terminating the Terminator: What to Do About Autonomous Weapons,
SCIENCE PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/01/terminating-theterminator-what-to-do-about-autonomous-weapons/.
58. One suspects, for instance, that the launch of an AWS into a position from which
it might attack will be perceived as a hostile act by any military unit within its range.
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creases with the size of the weapon’s target set regardless of the capacity of the
AWS to detect surrender.59
This implication in turn suggests that the use of AWS on a long leash
will be problematic while they are unable to reliably recognize surrender:
AWS on a long leash will tend to have larger target sets, both because having more autonomy to select targets is one way in which an AWS may count
as being on a long leash and because the longer the period between the release of an AWS and its impact, the more opportunity there is for unanticipated targets to happen to fulfill its targeting criteria. Interestingly, then, if
AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender are to be used on a
long leash, then a “responsibility gap” is actually required, lest the operator
be implicated in “attacking” a surrendered target when any of the enemy
forces in the target set of an autonomous weapon surrenders. Conceiving
of these systems as platforms which themselves launch attacks is one way
to open up this gap. Of course, if we do have the intuition that it is important that someone should be held morally responsible for each and every use of lethal force in the course of war,60 then the use of AWS on a long
leash may be problematic for this reason. Thinking about the ethics of surrender recognition highlights the persistence and significance of intuitions
about the attribution of responsibility even where the nature of the AWS is
not such as to raise questions about its moral agency.61
I do not pretend to have attempted to settle here either the appropriate
locus for the attribution of responsibility for casualties produced by AWS
or the question of whether (or, better, perhaps, which) AWS should be
thought of as weapons or platforms: these are matters for a much larger—
and longer—debate. Again, my hope is merely that these reflections on the
ethics of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender
might cast some light on these larger questions.

59. Note that by target set I mean here the number of enemy forces or units the AWS
might strike as a result of its targeting criteria, rather than the number of targets the individual who launched it intended it to attack: the former figure may be larger than the latter
where new targets fulfilling its targeting criteria enter the battlespace.
60. Sparrow (2007), supra note 3.
61. Roff, supra note 53.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that the difficulties involved in accurately identifying the nature of the actions of potential targets and the role played by context in
determining surrender mean that the recognition of surrender will be a profound challenge for autonomous weapon systems. Even if we ask only that
robots be capable of recognizing surrender at close to the level achieved by
human beings in wartime, reliable surrender recognition may be beyond the
capacity of machines, in some contexts at least, for some years to come. A
lack of the capacity to reliably recognize surrender would not rule out the
ethical use of AWS in certain roles where the question of surrender recognition seldom, if ever, arises, such as attacks on aircraft in flight or submarines while submerged. Moreover, various policies, discussed in Section V,
or combinations thereof, might mitigate the danger of attacking surrendered targets in some (other) contexts. Nevertheless, the lack of the capacity to reliably distinguish surrender would problematize the use of AWS in a
wide range of militarily valuable roles. I have suggested that the lack of the
capacity to reliably recognize surrender need not rule out their ethical use
where AWS could plausibly be described as operating on a “tight leash,”
such that it was appropriate to assign responsibility for surrender detection
to the person who authorizes the release of the weapon.62 However, it is
possible that some AWS, with more choice about which targets to engage
and/or long periods of time between release and impact, should be better
thought of as operating on a “long leash.” I have suggested that such applications are likely to be controversial and thus a crucial test for the moral
permissibility of the use of AWS that are unable to reliably recognize surrender. While I have been unable to settle the question of the ethics of the
use of AWS on a long leash, I have tried to clarify the arguments that might
plausibly be made for or against them. I have also highlighted a number of
historical analogies that are helpful for thinking through these questions.
Finally, I have explored the connections between the issues discussed in
this article and two important controversies in the larger debate concerning
the ethics of AWS.
It is possible that progress in the science and technology of artificial intelligence will eventually allow robots to achieve whatever standard of sur62. There may of course be other ethical concerns, unrelated to the question of surrender recognition, which would render the use of such weapons problematic: these are
beyond the scope of this article. For some discussion see Sparrow, supra note 3, and Sparrow, supra note 5.
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render recognition we believe to be required of them. Until that day, the
questions I have raised and tried—if not entirely successfully—to answer
here will remain crucial to the ethics of the design and use of AWS. Given
that the anticipated military value of AWS will establish a strong dynamic
driving towards their deployment and use, it is vital that philosophers and
ethicists consider these matters further.
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